What does the term 'nominalist' describe in Berkeley's context?

In Berkeley's context, the term 'nominalist' relates to the idea that knowledge and understanding are grounded in particular instances and the way we categorize or name these instances rather than in abstract forms or universal concepts. Berkeley, an idealist philosopher, emphasized that our comprehension of the world is shaped by our experiences and perceptions of specific objects, not by the existence of abstract entities independent of our perception.

By focusing on names and the classification of ideas, nominalism suggests that general terms do not correspond to real entities but are merely labels we use to group various experiences and perceptions. This approach aligns with Berkeley’s denial of the existence of material substances. Therefore, it underscores his argument that reality consists of ideas and their relationships rather than abstract forms divorced from particular experiences.

This relational focus on names and classifications captures the essence of what it means to be a nominalist in Berkeley's framework, as he would reaffirm that our understanding is primarily about how we identify and categorize our experiences, not about the existence of physical substances detached from those experiences.